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ho governs UK companies and how well do
they do it? The immediate response that
most people would give is the board of directors
and they operate largely in their own self-interest.
Few people would see shareholders as being at the
helm. The one exception is takeovers when share-
holders get the upper hand.
The difficulties of shareholder activism are illus-
trated by the activities of Phillips and Drew in
1998. Despite perceived poor performance, the
management of some of the companies, in which
they had large shareholdings, stubbornly remained
in place.2 As a result, Phillips and Drew actively
used their holdings to encourage hostile takeovers.
In the case of Marley, the buildings and materials
group, Phillips and Drew approached John
Mansfield, a much smaller company than Marley,
and pledged their holding of 24.9% in a forthcom-
ing hostile bid. They also agreed to invest 1.5 mil-
lion pounds in Mansfield if their bid failed. The
hostile bid for Marley produced a series of com-
peting bids, and large profits for the fund man-
agers.What is striking about this case is the inabil-
ity of financial institutions to effect changes in con-
trol in manifestly poorly performing companies
and that in the end Phillips and Drew had to stim-
ulate a takeover market to achieve this.
What underlies this perception of passive govern-
ance is the highly dispersed nature of share owner-
ship in the UK. As has been by now well docu-
mented, in comparison with virtually every
Continental European country, Far Eastern and
South American country, the UK has exceptionally
dispersed ownership (see La Porta et al.(1999)).In
most countries a high proportion of companies
have single majority shareholders in even the
largest quoted companies. However, dispersal of
ownership in the US is comparable to that in the
UK. The US is therefore a particularly important
country against which to compare UK governance
because, unlike Continental Europe and most of
the rest of the world,the underlying structure of its
capital markets and companies is similar.
In a paper with Luc Renneboog (2001) we docu-
ment the structure of ownership of UK companies,
we examine how well governance functions in rec-
tifying management of poorly performing firms,
and we draw contrasts with the US. The main
observations on which we expand in the subse-
quent sections are:
• While ownership is dispersed in the UK in com-
parison with most other countries, coalitions of
5 shareholders can on average control more
than 30% of outstanding equity.
• There is little evidence that shareholders in
practice exercise this potential to exert control.
• The single most important holders of large
blocks are insiders (directors) who use their
holdings to resist outside intervention.
• Boards play a weak role in corporate gover-
nance. Non-executive directors do not in gener-
al perform a disciplinary function.An important
exception is when the role of CEO and chair-
man are separated.
• In addition to an active takeover market, there
is a market in blocks of shares.
• Neither hostile takeovers nor markets in share
blocks are associated with the disciplining of the
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These observations stand in some contrast to those
reported in the US:
• Boards of directors are important in disciplining
management. Non-executive directors play an
important role in this process.
• Disciplinary takeovers and the market in share
blocks in the US are both associated with poor-
ly performing companies.
In the absence of active shareholder involvement,
governance in the UK relies on financial cons-
traints.We find that:
• Management is more likely to be replaced in
poorly performing companies that have poor
financial ratios.
• There is a high level of (distressed) new equity
issues by poorly performing UK companies.
These are associated with a high level of man-
agerial changes.
What can explain these differences, notwithstand-
ing the similar structures of the two countries’ cap-
ital markets? We believe that legal rules and regu-
lation play a key role. There are two areas where
we believe that regulatory differences between the
UK and US are particularly significant: fiduciary
responsibilities of directors and protection of
minorities, in particular in relation to takeovers
and new equity issues.The former are significantly
weaker and the latter significantly stronger in the
UK than in the US, leading to a reliance of gover-
nance in the UK on financial constraints relative to
boards.
In section 2 of this paper, we
describe the performance of
the takeover market and the
extent to which managerial
changes are related to poor
performance. In section 3 we
describe the results of the
research into UK governance
mechanisms. In section 4 we
explore how governance out-
comes in the US and UK might
be explained in terms of differ-
ences in legal and regulatory
rules and we discuss how recent events in the US
have altered our perception of corporate gover-
nance.
2. Market for corporate control
In this section on the takeover market we discuss
three questions:
– Do takeovers increase shareholder value?
– What role do hostile takeovers play in disciplin-
ing poorly performing management?
– Do targets underperform prior to being ac-
quired?
Do takeovers increase shareholder value?
In Table 1 below, we show the results of a recent
paper by Loughran and Vijh (1997) for a large sam-
ple of takeovers in the US that took place over the
period 1970–1989.They measure the returns from a
buy and hold strategy for shareholders of the tar-
get over the announcement period of the takeover
and up to 5 years subsequent to the consummation
of the merger. For the purposes of calculating
returns, it is assumed that the shareholders of the
target purchase shares in the bidder when the offer
is accepted, at a price that reflects any bid premi-
um. The excess returns around the announcement
date, i.e. the bid premium, are about the same in
mergers as in tender offers, 25.8% versus 24.5%.
However, after 5 years the cumulative returns to
shareholders in the merged firm has hardly
changed from 25.8% to 29.6% i.e. there are virtu-
ally no abnormal returns to the acquiring firm over
this period. In contrast, the returns in tender offers
have improved dramatically from 24.5% to
126.9%, suggesting large post merger gains, in
excess of those anticipated on announcement. All
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Table 1
Cumulative excess returns of 516 US merging firms from the bid
announcement to 5 years post merger in the period 1970 to 1989
No. Announcement  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Period
%
Mergers 419 25.8 28.5 24.0 20.9 30.4 29.6
Tender 
offers 97 24.5 42.2 48.4 69.6 81.6 126.9
Announcement period begins 2 days prior to the announcement date and ends with
the effective date of the acquisition.
Loughran & Vijh (1997).CESifo Forum 3/2002 15
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may not have been
underperforming
these returns are after the deduction of returns on
a suitable benchmark, thereby measuring ‘excess’
or ‘abnormal’ returns.
The authors’ explanation for the difference in ten-
der offers and mergers is ‘that tender offers, which
are often hostile to incumbent managers, may cre-
ate additional value as new managers are appoint-
ed. In the case of mergers, that are friendlier and
enjoy the co-operation of incumbent management,
the additional value creation is less likely to occur.’
(Page 1787).
Table 2 provides a measure of performance for a
large sample of UK takeovers by Higson and Elliot
(1996) that took place over the period 1975 to
1990. The abnormal returns are calculated after
deducting the returns of a benchmark consisting of
a sample of non-merging companies of equivalent
size to the merging companies.The bid premium to
target shareholders averages 37.5%, although it is
larger in hostile bids, at 42.7%, compared with
36.6% for friendly bids. Bidders do far less well
earning abnormal returns of about 0.43% or 1.3%
on a value weighted basis.Thus, there are substan-
tial gains to shareholders from takeovers but virtu-
ally all the gains accrue to the target.The long run
returns of these takeovers are roughly breakeven
on an equal weighted basis, although value weight-
ed returns of 12% suggest that larger acquisitions,
relative to the bidder, perform better than smaller
ones.3
Role of hostile takeovers in disciplining poorly
performing management
Although only 15% of all acquisitions in the sam-
ple, hostile takeovers comprise 40% of the largest
100 takeovers. Not only are the announcement
returns i.e. the bid premium, to target shareholders
higher in hostile takeovers, but the long-term per-
formance of the combined company, subsequent to
the merger, is better: 12.8% over 24 months com-
pared with 1.33% for the top 100.
Franks and Mayer (1996) made a detailed study of
80 hostile takeover bids in the UK in 1985–1986.
Like Higson and Elliot,they found much larger bid
premiums for successful tender offers where man-
agement opposed the bid, compared with friendly
bids: 29.8% compared with 18.4%. In opposed bids
there was also a very high degree of management
replacement after the bid. On average, 90% of the
target board was replaced compared with only
50% in friendly bids.They attributed the higher bid
premiums in hostile takeovers to larger merger
benefits rather than to lower returns to bidders.4
Are takeovers about the acquisition of 
underperforming companies?
If the market for corporate control is about replac-
ing weak management, we might expect evidence
that the targets of hostile takeovers are on average
underperforming companies; however, UK evi-
dence suggests little underperformance prior to
the bid. For example, over the five-years prior to
the bid, targets of hostile takeovers appreciated by
only – 0.14% per year; these returns included both
dividends and capital gains. The returns are virtu-
ally zero. The equivalent performance of the non-
merging sample is + 0.14%, again close to zero.
Shorter periods show somewhat worse perform-
ance for targets of hostile bids, but still not very
poor performance.5
The main research findings for the UK are that
takeovers in general are good for shareholders,
although most of the gains accrue to the target.6
Hostile takeovers look even more profitable and
this may be attributable to a greater willingness to
change management and make other more radical
Table 2
Long-term performance for a sample of 722 UK 
takeovers in the period 1975 to 1990
Announcement Abnormal 






weighted 0.43 37.5 0.83
Value weighted 1.3 33.2 12.0
Higson and Elliot (1996).
3 Note that these long run returns do not include the bid premium.
4 Hostile takeovers may also be effective as a threat to managers.
Thus, performance may be affected even in the absence of a bid.
5 Using another benchmark consisting of dividend changes, the
authors found confirmation that the majority of targets of hostile
takeovers were not poor performers.
6Accounting studies show somewhat different results to share price
studies. Meeks (1977) compares the accounting return on assets of
the merging firm both before and after the event.They find much
lower returns post-merger, and attribute the lower return to losses
on the acquisition. A study by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) in
the US shows similar results.A study by Healy,Palepu and Ruback
(1992) show that when you convert the accounting rates of return
to economic rates of return there are gains to merging.changes. However, the targets of hostile takeovers
do not show evidence of past poor performance.
Targets look to be average, or slightly below aver-
age, performers in comparison with other quoted
companies.
Experience with US takeovers appears different in
one important respect. A study on hostile
takeovers by Martin and McConnell (1991) found
higher bid premiums in hostile than in friendly
takeovers, and that takeovers, which led to the
replacement of the top manager in the target,tend-
ed to underperform their non-merging industry
counterparts prior to a bid. Shareholders of such
targets suffered abnormal returns of – 15.4% com-
pared with + 4.4% for targets, which were non-dis-
ciplinary. They concluded that ‘the takeover mar-
ket plays an important role in controlling the non-
value maximising behaviour of top corporate man-
agers.’ (page 671). Thus, the US market operates
more like a market for corporate control than the
UK market.
Another study of US hostile takeovers by Bhide
(1989) uses a different methodology to examine
the issue of whether hostile takeovers improve
value through managerial change. He examined
case studies of the restructuring activities that fol-
lowed 47 US hostile takeovers attempted between
1985–1986 and compared them with a randomly
selected group of friendly takeover transactions.
He found that hostile transactions were charac-
terised by added value in the acquisition process
whereas friendly acquisitions showed little evi-
dence of synergies. The latter were largely well
managed companies and its management was
largely left in place.
Even if takeover markets function well as a market
for corporate control they appear to be especially
expensive when the sole or prime objective is man-
agerial replacement or the correction of manageri-
al failure. The costs of changing control are high
and are significantly affected by takeover regula-
tion protecting minorities and the transaction costs
of acquisition.7 Also, shareholders may benefit on
average from mergers, but there is evidence that
the risk of failure is high. For example, in assessing
the returns to shareholders on the announcement
of bids about 46% of bidders lose value, notwith-
standing that on average bidders gain.
3. How are poorly performing companies 
restructured in the UK? 
If hostile takeovers do not provide the mechanism
for restructuring poorly performing companies,
how are those companies restructured? In this sec-
tion we summarise a study by Franks, Mayer and
Renneboog (2001) of under performing UK com-
panies and investigate the incidence of managerial
changes and their influences.
We collected data on ownership, performance, cap-
ital structure and board structure for the period
1988–1993. We chose 250 companies randomly
from all LSE quoted companies and an additional
50 poorly performing companies, defined as those
performing in the lowest decile of share price per-
formance during the period 1988–1991.
We address two questions:
How much managerial change is there in poorly
performing companies? 
What are the influences on managerial change?
(i) large outside shareholdings, (ii) non execu-
tive directors, (iii) high leverage giving rise to
new financing and encouraging intervention by
shareholders and creditors, and (iv) sales of
large share stakes performing like a market for
corporate control.
Another important question that is not addressed
is the extent to which particular forms of interven-
tion lead to better subsequent performance.
Board turnover and performance
We used 5 different measures of (poor) perfor-
mance including abnormal share price returns, div-
idend cuts/omissions, after-tax cash flow margins,
after-tax rates of return on book equity, and earn-
ings losses. Table 3 shows various measures of
board turnover related to abnormal share price
returns. Only for very poor performance, as mea-
sured by the worst decile, i.e. decile 1, is there a
strong relation between board turnover and per-







7 Changes in large share block ownership in Germany are associat-
ed with much smaller bid premiums to sellers of about 10% than in
the UK. Also, non-selling shareholders received virtually no gains
from the transaction (see Franks and Mayer (2001)).They explain
these differences in terms of the lower level of legal protection for
minority shareholders, the lack of effective takeover rules, and the
lower level of merger benefits.Their results suggest significant pri-







formance. For example, for the three-year period
following the year of poor performance there is an
annual rate of turnover of executive directors of
21.1% or 63% over three years for decile 1. The
turnover of the CEO is even higher, with a cumu-
lative rate of 86.4% over three years or an average
annual rate of 28.8%. Only for one other decile,
decile 2, is there significant management turnover;
for other below average performing deciles, 3 and
4, the level of managerial change is little different
from that of average performing companies.8
Types of ownership and concentration of 
ownership
In this section we briefly describe ownership in the
UK quoted share markets. This shows the level of
concentration of ownership and that with coali-
tions of shareholders, the often-cited monitoring
problems arising from dispersed ownership might
be substantially mitigated. We also compare the
level of concentration with that in US markets.
UK capital markets are relatively dispersed by
international comparison. For example, more than
85% of large German quoted companies have a
single blockholder with more than 25% of the vot-
ing equity.
In our UK sample, the largest single shareholding
averages about 15%, and for the five largest share-
holdings it averages 30–35% depending upon the
year. These numbers are similar to the US, where
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find an average owner-
ship of the five largest shareholders of 24.8% for
the average firm in the Fortune 500 compared with
33% for our UK sample. However, the level of
concentration does vary with the size of company.
This may be important since smaller companies
tend to have greater representation in the worst
performing deciles. This is illustrated in Table 4
where the worst and best performing companies
are shown to have much smaller equity capitalisa-
tions than average performing companies, i.e.
decile 5. Average performing companies are more
than twice as large as best performers, and are
about six times larger than companies in the worst
performing decile.
Using the largest shareholding as one metric of
concentration, it is 11.0% for average performers,
i.e. decile 5, compared with 16.9% for the sample
of worst performers, i.e. decile 1. This difference
mainly reflects lower insider ownership by direc-
tors, which is 6.8% among average performers
compared with 15.3% among poor performers.
Thus, the pattern of insider ownership explains a
large part of differences in the concentration of
ownership among firms of different size and per-
formance.Our results suggest that the size of insid-
er ownership plays an important role in protecting
or entrenching management from change when
performance is poor.9
The two largest types of shareholders are insti-
tutional shareholders and insider shareholders, i.e.
directors.Industrial shareholders are also significant.
The pattern of share blocks is not static in our
sample. There is a significant market in share
stakes. For example, there are 82 sales of stakes
greater than 10% for the period 1991–1993, and
this constitutes an annual turnover rate of 9%.We
explore the extent to which sales of blocks are
Table 3
Average board turnover annualised over 3 years 
for firms in different deciles 
of share price performance
Boad turnover Worst  Decile 5 Best 
decile: 1 decile: 10
%%%
Executive directors 21.1 8.1 6.9
Non-executive 7.4 4.2 4.8
CEO 28.8 11.6 10.4
Chariman 15.8 7.2 5.9
8 The average size of board is 9.3, and the average proportion of
non executive directors is 40%, and the CEO is combined with
Chairman in 32.9% of cases.
Table 4
Concentration of ownership by performance 
of firms in different deciles
Worst Decile  5 Best 
decile: 1 decile: 10
%%%
Largest shareholding 16.9 11.0 17.1
Sum of all large 
shareholdings 42.4 30.5 45.9
Institutions 17.9 17.2 17.4
Industrial companies 5.8 4.8 6.2
Families 3.5 0.9 4.7
All directors 15.3 6.8 17.6
Market cap. (mill. £) 132 993 408
9 Results are similar for the US. Insider holdings can be used to
entrench management.influenced by performance and lead to managerial
changes.
High leverage and managerial change
An important question explored in this study is the
extent to which high leverage and the need for new
financing may explain managerial changes among
poorly performing companies.Table 5 explores this
question. We show that where poorly performing
companies are not highly levered there is a com-
paratively low level of managerial turnover,where-
as where similarly performing companies have
high leverage there is a high level of managerial
change.
We calculate cumulative executive board turnover
and CEO turnover for a sample of poorly perform-
ing companies in the lowest decile of share price
performance for at least 1 year in the period 1988-
1993.Board turnover is ranked by quartile of inter-
est cover, with quartile 1 containing companies
with the lowest interest cover, and quartile 4 those
with the highest cover. Board turnover is accumu-
lated over 3 years.
We find that cumulative executive board turnover
is highest at 67.2% for companies with the lowest
interest cover. For companies with the highest
interest cover the cumulative board turnover is
about one half, at 34.3%. It should be stressed that
the performance of companies in different quar-
tiles are the same. Statistics for cumulative CEO
turnover show the same relation – low interest
cover is correlated with high turnover. A similar
relation holds when we use other definitions of
gearing.Thus,for the same poor performance,com-
panies with high leverage have much higher board
turnover than companies with low gearing. This
suggests that the relation between performance
and board turnover shown in Table 3 may be dri-
ven by a combination of high gearing and poor per-
formance and not poor performance on its own.
The importance of high leverage fits with the view
attributed to Jensen (1989) that high gearing is
good for corporate governance because poor per-
formance causes management to default on its loan
obligations and to seek renewal of facilities from
lenders who are better at monitoring management
than shareholders.
To investigate the role of shareholders and credi-
tors in firms with high gearing, we analysed 34 case
studies of poorly performing companies. In 28
cases the CEO or Chairman resigned, or both
resigned. In 18 cases or about 54% of the sample
new equity finance was raised. The question that
we investigated was the extent to which manageri-
al change was related to the provision of new equi-
ty financing and was triggered by shareholders and
(or) creditors.
Interviews with senior management at some of the
largest fund managers suggested that although
they might intervene where there was very poor
performance, in the face of management opposi-
tion, they were likely to avoid confrontation
because of the dislike of any consequent publicity
and the problems of co-ordinating other share-
holders. However, it was a very different story
when the poor performer required new finance:“it
comes to a crunch when companies raise addition-
al finance” or  “it all unpicks when a company
needs new money”.10
More formal regression results confirm that
although there is a strong relation between perfor-
mance and board turnover, concentration of own-
ership and the category of owner play a limited
role in the disciplining of management.The excep-
tions are inside ownership, which is used to
entrench existing management,and industrial com-
panies, which acquire stakes in poorly performing
companies and precipitate high executive board
turnover. Capital structure is important in explain-
ing high levels of board turnover and the signifi-
cance of new equity issues points to an important
role for shareholders in disciplining boards of
poorly performing companies when they are
forced to seek additional equity. Board structure
has little influence on overall executive board
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Executive board turnover and CEO turnover 
for a sample of poorly performing companies 
ranked by quartile of interest cover
Interest cover: Cum. executive  Cum. CEO 
turnover turnover
%%
Quartile 1 (Lowest) 67.2 69.6
Quartile 2 44.6 59.3
Quartile 3 45.4 55.9
Quartile 4 (Highest) 34.3 24.2
Board turnover is accumulated over 3 years.
10 These interviews were carried out in 1997–8.CESifo Forum 3/2002 19
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turnover but is important in the CEO regression
with separation of the position of CEO and chair-
man leading to higher CEO turnover. Boards are
therefore instrumental in dismissing CEOs in
response to earnings losses or dividend cuts. To
achieve wider board restructuring, investors
require the leverage of external finance provided
by high debt levels.
4. What might explain differences between 
outcomes in the US and UK?
There are three respects in which the exercise of
corporate control is quite different in the UK and
US.First,in the US,Weisbach (1988) reports a clos-
er relation of CEO turnover to performance in
firms where non-executive directors dominate the
board.Also,Gilson (1990) and Kaplan and Reishus
(1990) find that non-executive directors of poorly
performing companies lose reputation and are fre-
quently unable to find replacement positions. In
the UK, we found no evidence of disciplining by
non-executive directors;indeed,the relation is neg-
ative between the proportion of non-executives
and board turnover. However, there is a strong
association between CEO turnover and separation
of the positions of chairman and CEO; separation
seems to play an important role in CEO turnover.
Second, we find that takeover markets, and hostile
takeovers in particular, in the UK are not signifi-
cantly related to poor performance.In addition,we
find no significant relation between managerial
disciplining and large outside share blocks held by
financial institutions, individuals, families and non-
executive directors. The one exception involves
purchases of share blocks by industrial investors
where we report higher board turnover with poor
performance. In some contrast in the US there is
strong evidence in the US that hostile takeovers
are related to poorly performing targets. A study
by Bethel et al. (1998) reports that purchases of
share blocks by ‘active investors’ are targeted on
poorly performing companies. Also, Holderness
and Sheehan (1988) find that when their majority
blocks trade, there is substantial management
turnover and stock prices increase. Thus, in both
countries, changes in share blocks by active
investors perform a disciplinary function, although
the definition and size of active investors in the US
is considerably broader than that in the UK.
Third, we find that financial structure and new
financing are particularly significant influences on
board turnover in the UK.We are not aware of any
US study reporting this relation.
What could explain these differences? We argue
that legal rules or regulation could play an impor-
tant role.
Fiduciary responsibilities of directors
Powers to enforce fiduciary responsibilities of
directors in the UK are weak. Stapledon (1996)
records that although directors in the UK owe
their companies ‘fiduciary duties of honesty and
loyalty, and a duty of care and skill’, in practice
‘actions to enforce the duties of directors of quot-
ed companies have been almost non-existent’
(pp. 13–14). Parkinson (1993) states “Historically,
the standard of diligence set by the courts has been
comically low, as can be seen from the cases con-
cerning failure to supervise fellow directors and
managers who turn out to have been defrauding
the company”(page 98).All this might explain why
directors of UK companies perform more of an
advisory than a monitoring role.
In the US, directors (both executive and non-exec-
utive) have a duty of care to shareholders and they
can be sued for failing to fulfil fiduciary responsi-
bilities.However,in reviewing lawsuits in the 1960s
to 1987, Romano (1991) concludes that sharehold-
er litigation is a weak, if not ineffective instrument
of corporate governance. One important exception
is block ownership,where she finds that “for block-
holders who are not insiders, litigation can be a
valuable mechanism to redirect corporate policy”
(page 80).
Minority protection
The 1989 Companies Act requires that share
blocks in excess of 3% must be disclosed. Where
there is a controlling firm, the Stock Exchange lays
down specific rules concerning the controlling
shareholding and transactions with related parties.
For example, a majority of the directors of the
board of the subsidiary must be independent of the
parent firm. Shareholders have to be notified
about transactions with the parent firm and their
approval has to be sought in advance with the
related party abstaining from voting on the trans-
action.Minority shareholders are also protected in the
UK by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.
The Code requires that any person accumulating
15% or more of the voting rights of a firm must
declare his intentions about making a takeover,
and those acquiring 30% must offer to purchase all
remaining shares at the highest price paid by the
acquirer for the target over the previous twelve
months. Also, a 25% minority of shareholders can
block particular forms of new equity issues and
mergers, and new issues have to be made in the
form of rights issues where they exceed 5% of
share capital.
The US is different from the UK by allowing trans-
actions to be imposed on an unwilling minority but
ensuring that the minority is adequately protected
in objective market value terms. Protection of
investors, especially minorities, is primarily the
concern of the courts. For example, Delaware
courts in the US approved a discriminatory share
buyback by Unocal against Boone Pickens, who
was a large shareholder attempting a coercive
takeover (Herzel and Shepro, 1990). There is no
US equivalent of the UK Takeover Code requiring
full bids for companies to be made.However,there
is extensive State legislation discouraging take-
overs, and companies implement more defence
mechanisms than are permitted in the UK (Miller
(1998)).
Rights Issue Requirements
Differences in minority protection are particular-
ly pronounced in relation to new equity issues. In
the UK, the association of corporate governance
with new equity finance revolves crucially around
the investment banks and underwriters that
organise the issue. The Companies Act of 1985
states that seasoned new equity issues by compa-
nies must be in the form of rights issues and that
if shareholders fail to take up their rights, the
rights may be sold for the shareholder’s benefit.11
The Act also describes the circumstances under
which pre-emption rights may be disapplied. It
requires a super majority vote by shareholders of
at least 75% on each and every occasion an equi-
ty issue is to be made.
In the US,companies frequently obtain sharehold-
ers’ agreement to drop pre-emption rights. Such
agreement does not have to be renewed on each
occasion the firm makes a rights issue as in the
UK. Brealey and Myers (1996) suggest that ‘the
arguments [by management] for dropping pre-
emption rights do not make sense’ (p. 405). Our
results imply that managers have incentives to
drop pre-emption rights so as to allow issues of
equity to be made to new shareholders at a dis-
count to the equilibrium price, thereby diluting
existing shareholder wealth. The discount would
be in exchange for implicit or explicit agreements
to new shareholders to leave existing management
in place.
Thus while superficially the capital markets of the
UK and US are similar and both have common law
legal systems,there are subtle but important differ-
ences in regulation.These place greater burdens on
directors in the US than in the UK but more pro-
tection of minorities in takeovers, share block pur-
chases and new equity issues in the UK.They make
control by large shareholders more difficult and
expensive in the UK than in the US but facilitate
control when new financing is sought in new equi-
ty issues. Consistent with this, we have reported
that corporate governance in the UK relies more
heavily on financial factors and new financing, and
less on boards, non-executive directors and large
shareholders.
What is the significance of this difference? Is it
the case that the UK has evolved arrangements
that are different from those in the US but
perform similar functions? We would argue cau-
tion in concluding that the governance arrange-
ments in the UK and US are close substitutes.
Reliance on financial constraints and distress
implies that governance in the UK is primarily
restricted to the very worst performing compa-
nies.This is consistent with the observation that it
is only the very worst performing companies in
the UK that appear to display unusually high
board turnover.It suggests a slow response of UK
corporate governance to the emergence of poor
performance.
The implication is that the greater protection of
minority investors in the UK may have come at a
price. It facilitates the operation of securities mar-
kets and encourages wider participation by
investors but it may discourage active corporate
governance by large shareholders and markets in
corporate control.
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An alternative view is that governance procedures
in the UK and US are not static and evolve in
response to past performance. Capital markets are
constantly responding to past inefficiencies and
governance may be no exception to this rule.
Under this interpretation changes in legal rules are
unnecessary, and we might expect to see improved
governance procedures reflected in more recent
data. One study by Dahya, McConnell and Travlos
(2002) finds a stronger negative relation post
Cadbury between top management turnover and
corporate performance, and that increased sensi-
tivity of turnover to performance was concentrated
among firms that adopted the Cadbury Com-
mittee’s recommendations.
5. More recent events
How should recent events in the US affect our
views of governance in the two countries? There
are two important questions:Where was the failure
of governance? And, what is the best way of recti-
fying the failure? In the case of Enron the failure
appears to be more the result of serious conflicts of
interest between the auditor and the company. It is
less easy to judge the extent to which non-execu-
tive directors did not exercise sufficient care. In
this regard, it will be important to see how the US
courts are prepared to evaluate the business deci-
sions of the non-executive directors. In the past
they have largely avoided such an approach, citing
‘the business judgement rule’, in which the courts
decline to judge management’s business manage-
ment.
However, there does seem one area where non-
executives may have influenced the current crisis
of governance. They designed remuneration poli-
cies for management that were supposed to align
the interests of management and shareholders.
Often those packages were very asymmetric; that
is, large rewards were given for success and there
was little financial penalty for failure. Thus, they
did not mimic entrepreneurs who lose large
amounts of capital when they experience failure.
Dow and Raposo (2002) have shown that when
executive remuneration is very asymmetric and
large, i.e. has large upside with little downside,
chief executives will choose much riskier strategies
and less profitable ones from the point of view of
shareholders. In this respect, the excesses of the
past few years may be less a question of whether
the board should have spotted the error, and more
a question of the incentives given to management
to choose grand strategies which were not in share-
holders’ interests.
Given these excesses, what should be done? One
view might be to let the markets respond.
Shareholders do not like losing large parts of their
capital, and in the face of such losses they will
evolve changes in governance that will provide
remedies for the failure. A very different view is
that there is a serious market failure and institu-
tional shareholders have little incentive to devise
the right kind of innovations in governance. This
interpretation of the problem suggests more regu-
lation.
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